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The Expert as Educator: A Proposed
Approach to the Use of Battered Woman
Syndrome Expert Testimony
I. INTRODUCTION
Many women in the United States suffer physical abuse at the
hands of their mates,1 and a significant number of these women
eventually kill their abusers.' When these killings occur during
brutal batterings, prosecutors often do not bring criminal charges
against the women because the circumstances clearly indicate that
the women were acting in self-defense. A number of these women,
however, have killed their mates hours or even days after the most
recent battering incident.3 The delayed response apparently has
prompted prosecutors to bring charges against these battered wo-
men. Even though the women were not acting in response to a
then-existing assault, in a majority of the reported cases these wo-
men have asserted self-defense.4
The law of self-defense generally requires the defendant's rea-
sonable belief that she was in immediate danger of bodily harm
from her attacker's deadly force; thus, defensive force was neces-
1. See L. WALKER, THm BATrTxr WOMAN (1979). In her book Dr. Lenore Walker cites
a study by sociologists Straus, Gelles, and Steinmetz which found that a physical assault
occurred in 28% of all American homes in 1976. Id. at 20. See also D. MARTIN, BATTEMn
Wirvs (1976); Eisenberg & Micklow, The Assaulted Wife: "Catch 22" Revisited, 3 WOJEN's
RTS. L. REP. 138 (1977); Meyers, Battered Wives, Dead Husbands, STUDENT LAW., Mar.
1978, at 47; Note, Defense Strategies for Battered Women Who Assault Their Mates: State
v. Curry, 4 HAnv. WOMEN's L.J. 161 (1981); Note, The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill or
To Be Killed, 32 HASTINGs L.J. 895 (1981); Note, The Battered Wife-The Legal System
Attempts to Help, 48 U. CIN. L. Rzy. 419 (1979); Comment, The Battered Spouse Syn-
drome as a Defense to a Homicide Charge Under the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, 26 VnL.
L. REv. 105 (1980-81).
2. See Schneider & Jordon, Representation of Women Who Defend Themselves in
Response to Physical or Sexual Assault, 4 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 149 (1978); see also L.
WALKER, supra note 1.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 61-152; see also Note, Defense Strategies For
Battered Women Who Assault Their Mates: State v. Curry, supra note 1, at 161-62.
4. Schneider & Jordon, supra note 2, at 149 n.3. These authors list over 20 state crimi-
nal trials in which the prosecution charged battered women with assault or murder of their
mates. Seven of these women were acquitted on the ground of self-defense. Id. Although
diminished capacity or extreme emotional distress also would appear to be logical defenses,
most commentators agree that self-defense is the most effective theory of defense. See, e.g.,
Note, The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill or To Be Killed, supra note 1, at 918.
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sary for her own survival.' If the batterer neither carried a weapon
nor threatened the defendant at the time of the killing, a battered
woman defendant may not be able to satisfy this standard as
courts traditionally have applied it; rather, the courts find that the
defendant did not appear to have been in immediate danger of
harm from deadly force. One commentator suggests that a battered
woman may perceive her attacker's size and strength as deadly
force and the repeated episodes of abuse as threat of immediate
bodily harm.' A more flexible approach to the self-defense laws
would permit courts to consider the defendant's perception in the
context of the battering relationship.
Psychologists, who have studied why battered women remain
in battering relationships and have sought to determine what com-
mon characteristics these women share, have developed profiles of
"classic" battered women." By examining information gathered
during interviews with battered women, psychologists-most nota-
bly Dr. Lenore Walkere-have formulated theories concerning the
psychological make-up of battered women.' According to these the-
ories, battered woman display what clinical psychologists call
"learned helplessness" behavior. These women believe that they
5. W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 53, at 391 (1972). Some
statutes also require that the victim have attempted to retreat before resorting to force
except when the attack occurs in the home or place of business. Id. Model Penal Code § 3.04
bases the use of defensive force on the victim's belief (rather than a reasonable belief)
"that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the
use of unlawful force." MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
6. Comment, The Use of Expert Testimony in The Defense of Battered Women, 52
U. COLO. L. Rav. 587, 589-91 (1981). This commentator draws a useful analogy to State v.
Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977), in which defendant Yvonne Wanrow, who
was not a battered woman, asserted self-defense when charged with killing a male acquain-
tance who had approached her child. Defendant suspected the man of having raped her
neighbor's daughter and had reason to believe that he frequently carried deadly weapons. In
addition, defendant was on crutches at the time of the shooting. Recognizing that defen-
dant's knowledge of the victim's dangerous reputation was relevant to her self-defense
claim, the Washington Supreme Court held that the jury could consider "all the facts and
circumstances known to the defendant" even though they did not occur immediately prior
to the shooting. Id. at 234, 559 P.2d at 555. The court also found that a jury could properly
consider that a woman defendant's perception of what constitutes deadly force may differ
from the "reasonable man standard" because women view themselves as lacking adequate
physical strength to-protect themselves. Id. at 240, 559 P.2d at 558-59. The commentator
suggests that courts should apply the Wanrow court's holding to battered women cases and
admit evidence of events and circumstances known to defendant prior to the killing.
7. L. WALKER, supra note 1, at 31.
8. Dr. Walker appears to have been the first psychologist to serve as an expert witness
for battered women defendants. See discussion of Ibn-Tamas v. United States infra text
accompanying notes 61-82.
9. L. WALKER, supra note 1.
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are helpless to change their lives,10 and they live in constant fear of
their batterers." Contrary to general belief, they do not stay in
battering relationships because they enjoy the beating.1 2 This psy-
chological characterization of battered women is called the "bat-
tered woman syndrome."13
In 1979 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held in Ibn-
Tamas v. United States 4 that under certain circumstances a bat-
tered woman defendant charged with killing her husband may in-
troduce expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome.1 5 The
Ibn-Tamas court indicated that this expert testimony could be rel-
evant to defendant's self-defense claim."
Since the Ibn-Tamas decision, many commentators have sug-
gested that expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome
could be a useful self-defense tool.1 7 Following the Ibn-Tamas
lead, defense attorneys throughout the country have called on Dr.
Walker and other psychologists to testify in criminal trials of bat-
tered women. ' Ibn-Tamas, however, is not the final word on the
10. Id. at 42-54; see also infra note 13.
11. L. WALKER, supra note 1, at 50; see Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678
(1981) (battered woman syndrome expert explained that primary emotion of a battered wo-
man is fear).
12. L. WALKER, supra note 1, at 20. Dr. Walker suggests that most people believe a
battered woman is masochistic and experiences pleasure "often akin to sexual pleasure,
through being beaten by the man she loves." Id.
13. Dr. Walker first offered her evidence on the battered woman syndrome in Ibn-
Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979), in which she told the court that her
studies revealed
three consecutive phases in the relationships: "tension building," when there are small
incidents of battering; "acute battering incident," when beatings are severe; and "lov-
ing-contrite," when the husband becomes very sorry and caring. . . .[W]omen in this
situation typically are low in self-esteem, feel powerless, and have few close friends,
since their husbands commonly "accuse ... them of all kinds of things with friends,
and they are embarrassed. They don't want to cause their friends problems, too." Be-
cause there are periods of harmony, battered women tend to believe their husbands are
basically loving, caring men; the women assume that they, themselves, are somehow
responsible for their husbands' violent behavior. They also believe, however, that their
husbands are capable of killing them, and they feel there is no escape. Unless a shelter
is available, these women stay with their husbands, not only because they typically lack
a means of self-support but also because they fear that if they leave they will be found
and hurt even more.
Id. at 634. In Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981), a clinical psychologist
testified that a battered woman becomes increasingly afraid for her own well-being and that
her primary emotion is fear. Id. at 614, 277 S.E.2d at 680 (1981).
14. 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979).
15. Id. at 638-39. See infra text accompanying notes 61-82.
16. 407 A.2d at 634-35.
17. See authorities cited supra notes 1-2.
18. See Note, Defense Strategies for Battered Women Who Assault Their Mates,
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use of this expert testimony. Recently, three state supreme courts
reviewed trial court refusals to admit expert testimony on the bat-
tered woman syndrome. The Ohio Supreme Court in State v.
Thomas19 enumerated four deficiencies in the evidence and ruled it
wholly inadmissible. In Buhrle v. State20 the Wyoming Supreme
Court held that although the expert testimony may be admissible
under different circumstances it was inadmissible in Buhrle be-
cause the defense did not present an adequate foundation. The
Georgia Supreme Court held in Smith v. State21 that the evidence
was admissible because it was a proper subject for expert
testimony.
The conflicting decisions in Thomas, Buhrle, and Smith illus-
trate the difficulties encountered by state courts in deciding
whether to admit expert testimony on the battered woman syn-
drome. This Recent Development examines the requirements for
the admissibility of expert testimony and analyzes the status of
battered woman syndrome expert testimony within these general
evidentiary rules. The Recent Development then suggests an ap-
proach for trial court judges to use in determining whether to ad-
mit such evidence and submits that expert testimony on the bat-
tered woman syndrome can satisfy admissibility requirements.
Finally, this Recent Development proposes that courts should ad-
mit the evidence for the limited purpose of educating jurors about
the battered woman syndrome and dispelling their mistaken be-
liefs about battered women.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Federal Rules of Evidence have liberalized evidentiary
standards.22 The intent of the more liberal rules is to admit all rel-
evant evidence unless an important policy reason outweighs admis-
sion.23 For example, the desire to avoid unfairly prejudicing either
party or wasting judicial time and resources would justify exclud-
State v. Curry, supra note 1; infra text accompanying notes 101-52.
19. 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 521-22, 423 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1981); see infra text accompany-
ing notes 101-13.
20. 627 P.2d 1374, 1378 (Wyo. 1981); see infra text accompanying notes 114-36.
21. 247 Ga. 612, 619, 277 S.E.2d 678, 683 (1981); see infra text accompanying notes
137-52.
22. See generally Symposium on the Federal Rules of Evidence, 49 TEnmP. L.Q. 860
(1976). The Federal Rules of Evidence have influenced the evidentiary rules of many states.
See P. ROTHSTmN, FEmRL RuLEs or EvmEacE at xii (1978).
23. See FED. R. Evm. 401-403.
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ing evidence in some situations.2 Traditionally, the courts have
limited the use of lay and expert opinion testimony because of a
fear that this evidence will usurp the jury's role of forming opin-
ions based upon the facts in evidence.2 5 Recognizing that expert
witnesses can draw inferences which jurors often cannot draw,
courts have established special requirements to limit the admissi-
bility of expert testimony.8
A. The Opinion Rule
In its early form the opinion rule of evidence prohibited a wit-
ness from testifying about his opinion; he could testify only about
facts. Exceptions to this rule developed, permitting an opinion if
it was necessary to an understanding of the testimony or if it sup-
plied a "short-hand rendition" of a total situation. If a witness
offered testimony about an ultimate issue in a case, the courts were
extremely careful to exclude opinion because of the fear that the
closer a witness came to telling the jury how to decide a case, the
greater the risk was that the opinion would "invade the province of
the jury."" The courts believed that the jury would "forego inde-
pendent analysis of the facts and bow too readily to the opinion of
an expert or otherwise influential witness. '30
The Federal Rules of Evidence had the effect of transforming
the opinion rule into a rule of convenience. Rules 701 and 702 of
the Federal Rules provide that lay and expert witnesses may tes-
tify in the form of opinions or inferences.3 1 Further, Rule 704 pro-
vides that opinion evidence otherwise admissible "is not objection-
able because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the
24. FED. R. EvID. 403 and Advisory Committee note. Rule 403 provides, "Although
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considera-
tions of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
25. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 11 (E. Cleary
2d ed. 1972).
26. Id. § 13.
27. Id. § 11; see, e.g., Baltimore & O.R.R. Co. v. Schultz, 43 Ohio St. 270, 1 N.E. 324
(1885).
28. C. McCoRMICK, supra note 25, § 11.
29. Id. § 12, at 27.
30. Id.
31. FED. R. EVID. 701, 702. Rule 701 provides that a lay witness may testify in the
form of an opinion if the opinion is rationally based on the perception of the witness and
helpful to the understanding of a fact in issue. Rule 702 provides that an expert may testify
in the form of an opinion if the testimony will assist the trier of fact.
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trier of fact.""2 Although some state courts continue to pay lip ser-
vice to the opinion rule,33 most courts apply only a rule of prefer-
ence for fact over opinion. Currently, a majority of the state courts
have adopted the Federal Rules' approach, which allows an expert
to render an opinion regarding an ultimate issue if the evidence
meets the other requirements for expert testimony. 4
B. General Requirements for Expert Testimony
McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence states the re-
quirements for the use of expert testimony:
the subject of the inference must be so distinctly related to some science,
profession, business or occupation as to be beyond the ken of the average
layman... and the witness must have sufficient skill, knowledge or experi-
ence in that field or calling as to make it appear that his opinion or inference
will probably aid the trier of fact in his search for the truth.35
If the expert testimony meets these criteria the court will admit
the testimony unless it finds that "the state of the pertinent art of
scientific knowledge does not permit a reasonable opinion to be as-
serted by an expert. ' '3 1
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 is a more liberal rule of admissi-
bility than the standard set forth by McCormick. Under rule 702
the evidence need not be "beyond the ken of the average lay-
man, 3 7 but instead need only "assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. '3 8 Under Rule
702 the expert may testify "in the form of an opinion or other-
wise."'39 Federal courts require, of course, that expert testimony
conform to the general rule that its probative value outweigh its
prejudicial impact.40
32. FED. R. EvID. 704.
33. See, e.g., Lampkins v. United States, 401 A.2d 966 (D.C. 1979); Douglas v. United
States, 386 A.2d 289 (D.C. 1978).
34. C. McCoRMICK, supra note 25, § 12; see also Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 277
S.E.2d 678 (1981) (court rejected view that opinion evidence about an ultimate issue is not
admissible and stated that a majority of courts agree on this point).
35. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 25, § 13, at 29-30.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973); State v. Owens,
112 Ariz. 223, 540 P.2d 695 (1975); Hestad v. Pennsylvania Life Ins. Co., 204 N.W.2d 433
(Minn. 1973).
38. FED. R. EvID. 702.
39. Id.




1. Subject of the Inference Must Be Beyond the Ken of the
Average Layman
The requirement that the subject of the inference be beyond
the ken of the average layman or that the evidence assist the trier
of fact 1 is basically a subject matter limitation. 2 Courts are reluc-
tant to permit experts to testify about subjects that are within the
common knowledge or experience of the average person because of
a fear that the "aura" of expertise will unduly influence the jury.4"
Expert testimony regarding theories or information that explains
evidence in a case, but about which the jury is unfamiliar, probably
would satisfy the subject matter requirement.
Generally, courts have held that some subject matter areas are
appropriate for expert testimony. Medical expert testimony, for
example, in which a medical doctor testifies about the probable
cause of death of an individual, is usually appropriate because the
average person cannot examine medical evidence with sufficient
knowledge and skill to understand its significance.," By contrast,
expert testimony concerning character is generally inappropriate.
For example, psychiatrists and psychologists may not testify about
a criminal defendant's propensity for crime or peaceful character;
courts believe that juries are capable of assessing an individual's
character without the aid of experts. 5 Similarly, expert testimony
regarding a criminal defendant's state of mind at the time he com-
mitted an offense is improper unless the defendant raises insanity
or diminished capacity as a defense.'6 Thus, courts have prohibited
psychologists and psychiatrists from testifying that fear motivated
a defendant at the time of an offense because trial judges perceive
41. See supra text accompanying note 35.
42. See United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973); Farris v. Interstate
Circuit, 116 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1941).
43. See United States v. MacDonald, 485 F. Supp. 1087, 1096 (E.D.N.C. 1979); Dyas v.
United States, 376 A.2d 827 (D.C. 1977); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Wyo. 1981).
44. See, e.g., State v. Owens, 112 Ariz. 223, 540 P.2d 695 (1975) (doctor permitted to
testify that severe lacerations could not have occurred accidentally); State v. Wilkerson, 295
N.C. 559, 247 S.E.2d 905 (1978) (doctor permitted to testify that bruises on a deceased child
did not occur from daily activity, but were caused by child battering).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Webb, 625 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1980) (expert not permit-
ted to testify concerning peaceful character and propensity for crime); Douglass v. United
States, 386 A.2d 289 (D.C. 1978) (defendant accused of homosexual rape not permitted to
introduce expert testimony by psychologist that defendant had a negative reaction to homo-
sexual activity).
46, See, e.g., State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 610 P.2d 522 (1980); State v. Matthews,
221 N.W.2d 563 (Minn. 1974).
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fear as an emotion within the scope of the jury's understanding.47
2. The Expert Must Be Qualified in the Field
The requirement that an expert have sufficient skill, knowl-
edge, or experience in the field so that his opinion probably will
aid the trier of fact is relatively easy to satisfy.48 A witness may
qualify as an expert based upon education or experience.49 Courts
have found that purported experts lack the necessary special skill
to aid the trier of fact when, for example, a witness holds himself
out as an expert in community standards, but lacks experience
with the community at large,50 or when a generalist in a field at-
tempts to testify about an aspect of the field with which he is unfa-
miliar.5 1 Generally, however, once a witness shows that he is mini-
mally qualified, his level of expertise becomes a question of
credibility for opposing counsel to attack.2
3. State of the Pertinent Art or Scientific Knowledge Must
Permit an Expert to Assert a Reasonable Opinion
Based on the concern that expert testimony without a recog-
nized theoretical basis will mislead or perhaps deceive juries,
courts require that the principle upon which the expert's testimony
rests "be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance
in the field to which it belongs." 53 When the evidence is of a scien-
tific nature, a showing that the principles and procedures underly-
ing the expert testimony are reliable and sufficiently accurate may
satisfy the general acceptance requirement." The proponent of the
testimony often faces a difficult task when he seeks to establish
that a new scientific technique has become generally accepted. In
47. See, e.g., State v. Matthews, 221 N.W.2d 563 (Minn. 1974).
48. United States v. Moore, 604 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir. 1979), provides an example of the
relative ease with which an expert can qualify. In Moore a witness stated that only one day
of training was necessary for his job (studying tapes for copyright purposes). Reasoning that
it did not have a duty to train the jury, the Moore court found the expert qualified.
49. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 25, § 13.
50. See, e.g., Fennekohl v. United States, 354 A.2d 238 (D.C. 1976) (one who has
viewed many obscene films over a 15-year period does not qualify as an expert on commu-
nity obscenity standard).
51. See, e.g., Hestad v. Pennsylvania Life Ins. Co., 204 N.W.2d 433 (Minn. 1973) (dep-
uty coroner's testimony that carbon monoxide poisoning was suicide and not accident
inadmissible).
52. See infra text accompanying notes 163-68.
53. Frye v. United States, 294 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
54. See United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977).
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the early case of Frye v. United States55 the court, confronted with
the new lie detector technique, described the problem with which
courts must grapple:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the ex-
perimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the de-
duction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general ac-
ceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. 56
In determining whether to admit or exclude testimony about a new
technique, courts have considered the following: The number of
published articles on the subject;57 the number of cases that have
allowed testimony based upon the theory;5 8 whether others in the
field have duplicated the results of the research;59 and testimony
by others in the field on whether the theory has gained general
acceptance1 0
C. The Development of Expert Testimony on the Battered
Woman Syndrome
1. Ibn-Tamas v. United States
Ibn-Tamas v. United States61 was the first case to consider
whether expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome is ad-
missible in a trial of a battered woman charged with killing her
batterer. Defendant in Ibn-Tamas shot her husband shortly after
an altercation during which her husband threatened her with a pis-
tol."2 The evidence revealed that defendant's husband had severely
55. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
56. Id. at 1014. The courts are not unduly prejudiced against the introduction of ex-
pert testimony that is based upon a theory that is in its infancy. Most courts agree that
"neither newness nor lack of absolute certainty . . . suffices to render it inadmissible in
court. Every useful new development must have its first day in court." United States v.
Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 438 (6th Cir. 1970).
57. See United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 441 (6th Cir. 1970) (court admitted evi-
dence, noting that over 100 articles on neutron activation analysis, the subject in Stifel, had
been published).
58. Id.; see also United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1975) (court recognized
that about one-half of the courts admitted voiceprint evidence and that the trend was to
admit it).
59. See United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Mac-
Donald, 485 F. Supp. 1087 (E.D.N.C. 1979).
60. See, e.g., United States v MacDonald, 485 F. Supp. 1087 (E.D.N.C. 1979).
61. 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
62. Id. at 630. Although the facts in Ibn-Tamas were in conflict, uncontradicted evi-
dence indicated that, on the morning of the killing, defendant's husband held up a revolver
1982]
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beaten her many times over the course of their three and one-half
year marriage. Defendant asserted self-defense to the charge of
second degree murder. At trial she testified about the battering in-
cidents to support her claim that she was in imminent fear of her
life at the time she shot her husband. 3 On cross-examination the
prosecution attempted to discredit her testimony by implying that
she had exaggerated the violent nature of her marriage and by sug-
gesting that "the logical reaction of a woman who was truly fright-
ened by her husband (let alone regularly brutalized by him) would
have been call the police from time to time or leave him. 64
Defendant offered the testimony of Dr. Lenore Walker, a psy-
chologist who had studied 110 battered women, to explain the bat-
tered woman syndrome.6 5 Dr. Walker planned to inform the jury
"that there is an identifiable class of persons who can be character-
ized as battered women" and to discuss "why the mentality and
behavior of such women are at variance with the ordinary lay per-
ception of how someone would be likely to react to a spouse who is
a batterer."' 6 Dr. Walker also intended to tell the trier of fact that
defendant was a "classic case" of a battered woman. 7 The defense
urged that the testimony be admitted to rebut the prosecution's
implications that defendant's failure to leave her violent husband
indicated that she did not actually fear him and to "provide a basis
from which the jury could understand why [defendant] perceived
herself in imminent danger at the time of the shooting."6 8 The trial
court refused to admit the evidence on the basis, inter alia, that
the evidence would invade the province of the jury. 9 Defendant
was convicted of second degree murder and she appealed, contend-
ing in part that the trial court had improperly excluded Dr.
Walker's testimony. The appellate court reversed and remanded
the case to the trial court for a consideration of two of the require-
ments for expert testimony that the trial court apparently had not
addressed.70
to defendant's face and said "You are going out of here this morning one way or the other."
Id.
63. Id. at 629, 633.
64. Id. at 633-34.
65. Id. at 634. For a discussion of the battered woman syndrome, see L. WALKER,
supra note 1; see also supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
66. 407 A.2d at 634.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 631; see supra text accompanying notes 27-34.
70. 407 A.2d at 640. The Ibn-Tamas court required that the trial judge rule on each of
750 [Vol. 35:741
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The Ibn-Tamas appellate court first rejected the trial court's
reasoning that the proffered testimony would invade the province
of the jury.7 1 The court explained that Dr. Walker did not plan to
testify about the ultimate issue of whether defendant "actually and
reasonably believed she was in danger when she shot her hus-
band.17 2 Instead, the court stated that the purpose of the testi-
mony was to supply background information to aid the jury in de-
ciding that issue. 3 According to Ibn-Tamas, courts have eroded
the "ultimate issue rule" to the point that the only opinions they
exclude are those that "submit the whole case to an expert."7 " The
Ibn-Tamas court explained that an expert can also improperly pre-
empt the jury's role by testifying about matters that the jury is
equally competent to consider.7 5 Dr. Walker's testimony, however,
satisfied the requirement that the subject be beyond the ken of the
average layman 7  because it offered an interpretation of defen-
dant's behavior-in particular her failure to leave her hus-
band-that was at variance with the ordinary lay perception.
The Ibn-Tamas court then addressed the second and third re-
quirements for expert testimony: the proffered expert must be
qualified in the field and the state of the art must permit an expert
opinion. Although the court held that it could not determine from
the trial court record whether these criteria were present, the court
found that the record did not show as a matter of law that the
testimony failed to meet these requirements.7 8 The court re-
manded the question of Dr. Walker's qualifications as an expert
apparently because the trial court did not certify her as an expert;
the three elements for expert testimony-subject matter, expert qualification, and state of
the art. See supra text accompanying notes 41-60. The Ibn-Tamas trial judge apparently
had not ruled on the latter two elements. For a critical analysis of the Ibn-Tamas decision
to remand the questions to the trial judge, see Note, Expert Testimony Relating to Subject
Matter of Battered Women Admissible on Issue of Self-Defense, 11 SETON HALL L. REV.
255 (1980).




75. Id. This limitation is a variation on the "beyond the ken of the average layman"
requirement discussed supra text accompanying notes 41-47.
76. 407 A.2d at 635.
77. Id. at 634. The Ibn-Tamas court compared the expert testimony on battered wo-
man syndrome with the psychiatrists' testimony offered in United States v. Hearst, 412 F.
Supp. 889 (N.D. Cal. 1976). In Hearst psychiatrists testified about the effects of kidnapping,
prolonged incarceration, and psychological and physical abuse on defendant.
78. 407 A.2d at 639, 640.
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nevertheless the court listed her credentials in a footnote.79
The court discussed the third requirement-state of the
art-at greater length. Rejecting the government's contention that
the battered woman syndrome has not gained general acceptance,
the court explained that to meet the general acceptance criteria
the methodology employed by the expert must be generally ac-
cepted-the test results need not be.80 Thus, the defense must
show that Dr. Walker's method of studying battered wo-
men-through interviews and compilations of the interviewees' re-
sponses-conforms with generally accepted clinical psychological
study. The Ibn-Tamas court remanded this question to the trial
court.
After determining that the expert testimony could be admissi-
ble, the court inquired whether the probative value of the evidence
outweighed its prejudicial impact. The court reasoned that since
the trial judge had already admitted substantial evidence of the
beatings, Dr. Walker's testimony would not further prejudice the
prosecution.8 1 The court concluded that the probative value of the
evidence-its bearing on defendant's perception and behavior at
the time of the killing-outweighed its minimal prejudicial
impact.8 2
2. Other State Court Reactions to Battered Woman Syndrome
Evidence
A few state appellate court opinions since the Ibn-Tamas deci-
sion have considered battered woman syndrome evidence. Al-
though these courts do not squarely address the admissibility of
this evidence, their brief discussions of the evidence offer some in-
sight into the limited history of expert testimony on the battered
woman syndrome.
In People v. Powell defendant was convicted of second degree
murder of her former husband.8 The evidence at trial showed that
her husband had battered her for an extended period of time."
79. Id. at 637 n.18.
80. Id. at 637-38.
81. Id. at 639.
82. Id.
83. 102 Misc. 2d 775, 424 N.Y.S.2d 626 (Tompkins County Ct. 1980).
84. Id. at 776-77, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 628-29. On the night that defendant shot her hus-
band, he had taken defendant and their son at gunpoint to a hotel. Defendant testified that
during the night while her husband was sleeping she took the gun and that it went off when
her husband jumped up. Id. at 777-78, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 628-29.
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Defendant did not offer expert testimony on the battered woman
syndrome at trial. Defendant appealed her conviction on the the-
ory that expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome was
newly discovered evidence that warranted a reversal.8 The appel-
late court held that the expert testimony did not constitute newly
discovered evidence and affirmed defendant's conviction.8 6 Al-
though the court did not hold that the evidence would have been
inadmissible, it stated that the evidence would "not add anything"
to defendant's self-defense claim because defendant already had
presented evidence of the history of the battering relationship.8 7
Morrison v. Bradley88 concerned a wrongful death action for
negligence against a battered wife who had killed her husband. De-
fendant in Morrison claimed that severe battering by her husband
over a long period of time caused her actions, and she sought to
use the battered woman syndrome as a defense.89 The Morrison
court refused to allow this theory as a defense in a wrongful death
action.90 The court did not reject expressly expert testimony on the
battered woman syndrome, and it declined to either "accept [or]
reject the validity of the general theory."9' 1
In People v. White92 the court held one aspect of expert testi-
mony on the battered woman syndrome irrelevant and immaterial
to a battered woman's self-defense claim. In White the defendant
offered the testimony of a physician who was not an expert on the
battered woman syndrome. The defense asked him on direct exam-
ination whether battered women "tend to remain with their
mates."9 3 In response to the prosecution's objection, the defense
urged that the answer to this question had a bearing on the credi-
bility of defendant's self-defense claim. The White court held that
the trial court properly excluded the question because it was irrele-
vant to a self-defense claim.94 The White court stated that the is-
sue of self-defense should be determined in light of only those
85. Id. at 779, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 629.
86. Id. at 782-83, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
87. Id. The Powell court also indicated that the evidence might have been inadmissi-
ble at trial to prove self-defense. Id.
88. 622 P.2d 81 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980).
89. Id. at 82. The facts in Morrison do not indicate whether the defendant offered an
expert to explain the battered woman syndrome.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 90 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 414 N.E.2d 196 (1980).
93. Id. at 1072, 414 N.E.2d at 200. The physician in White testified that he treated




events that immediately preceded the killing.95 The decision in
White, however, does not necessarily signify that the court would
never admit expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome.
The White court did not reject Ibn-Tamas, but rather distin-
guished it, stating,
[T]hat decision does not assist defendant. There, the expert witness was a
clinical psychologist who had studied the cases of 110 battered women. Ap-
parently, this expert had examined the defendant from a psychological point
of view because the defendant sought to elicit her opinion as to "the extent to
which appellant's personality and behavior corresponded to those of 110 bat-
tered women Dr. Walker had studied.""
This statement suggests that the White court might have permit-
ted a qualified expert to testify about the defendant's similarities
to other battered women.
In the final appellate opinion dealing with expert testimony on
the battered woman syndrome, State v. Baker,9 7 the defendant was
a battering husband charged with attempted first degree murder of
his wife. At trial defendant pleaded not guilty by reason of in-
sanity. Defendant's wife and daughter testified that defendant had
abused them on numerous occasions. In support of his insanity de-
fense, defendant called two psychiatrists who testified that defen-
dant was legally insane at the time of the offense.9 8 On rebuttal the
trial court admitted the testimony of the government's expert wit-
ness on the battered woman syndrome. The witness testified that
wife beating is part of a pattern of domestic violence that does not
appear to result from mental illness or insanity.9" On appeal the
court rejected defendant's argument that this expert testimony was
not sufficiently relevant to outweigh its prejudicial impact.100 Al-
though the Baker court did not comment generally upon the ad-
missibility of expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome,
its holding that this evidence was proper under these facts indi-
cates that the court, at the minimum, would seriously consider ad-
mitting the evidence in a trial in which the defendant "s a battered
wife charged with killing her mate.
95. Id. But see supra note 6.
96. 90 M11. App. 3d at 1072, 414 N.E.2d at 200.
97. 120 N.H. 773, 424 A.2d 171 (1980).
98. Id. at 774, 424 A.2d at 172.
99. Id. at 775, 424 A.2d at 172.




A. State v. Thomas
In State v. Thomas'01 defendant shot her husband during an
argument in which he pushed her onto a couch. The evidence
showed that defendant's husband had battered her for more than
three years. Although defendant presented three different versions
of the incident to the court, none of the versions indicated that her
husband was beating her at the time of the shooting.102 Defendant
asserted self-defense in response to a charge of murder, but was
found guilty in a jury trial. 03
At trial defendant offered expert testimony on the battered
woman syndrome to aid the jury in weighing the evidence concern-
ing her subjective state of mind at the time of the killing.'" The
trial court refused to admit the evidence and defendant appealed.
The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed her conviction and ordered a
new trial on the ground that the trial court had improperly ex-
cluded the expert testimony offered to show the state of mind of
battered women. 0 5 The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the appel-
late court, holding that battered woman syndrome expert testi-
mony is not admissible to show self-defense. °8 The court distin-
guished Ibn-Tamas on the grounds that the expert in that case
offered an "unequivocal opinion," based upon personal counseling
with the defendant, that defendant was a "classic case" of a bat-
tered woman and did in fact perceive herself to be in imminent
danger at the time she killed her husband.'0 7 After distinguishing
Ibn-Tamas, however, the Thomas court stated that "even if the
facts in Ibn-Tamas. . .were similar to the case at bar, we reject
its rationale and decline to follow it."'' 0
101. 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981).
102. Id. at 518-19, 423 N.E.2d at 138. In one of the versions she presented, defendant
got up from the couch, walked to the chair in which her husband was sitting, and shot him.
In the second version defendant's husband was rising from a chair to attack her further
when she shot him. In the third version, defendant picked up the gun after her husband had
pushed her on the couch, followed him as he walked away, and, after saying "I've had
enough," shot him. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. For a description of the battered woman syndrome, see supra note 13.
105. 66 Ohio St. 2d at 519, 423 N.E.2d at 138.
106. Id. at 522, 423 N.E.2d at 140.
107. Id. at 521 n.3, 423 N.E.2d at 139-40 n.3. Apparently the expert in Thomas was
not a psychologist but a "psychiatric social worker" who had not counseled defendant per-
sonally. Id. at 521, 423 N.E.2d at 140.
108. Id. at 521 n.3, 423 N.E.2d at 139-40 n.3.
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The Thomas supreme court opinion quoted with approval
eight reasons that the appellate court's dissent had presented for
excluding the evidence. 109 In addition, the Thomas court presented
its own list of four reasons for favoring exclusion. First, according
to the court, the evidence is immaterial and irrelevant to self-de-
fense because only evidence that establishes a bona fide fear of im-
minent danger or great bodily harm and a belief that the only
means of escape is the use of deadly force is admissible to prove
self-defense. 110 Second, the court explained that the evidence was
inadmissible because juries are "well able to understand" whether
the defendant has proven self-defense on the basis of "the partici-
pants' words and actions before, at, and following the murder, in-
cluding defendant's explanation of the surrounding circum-
stances," and because the testimony is not so "distinctly related to
some science, profession or occupation so as to be beyond the ken
of the average lay person."11 Third, the court simply stated that
"no general acceptance of the expert's particular methodology has
been established."'1 2 Last, the court found the evidence prejudicial
because it might lead the jury to decide the case on the basis of
stereotypical facts about battered women presented by the expert
testimony instead of the actual facts in the case. 1
B. Buhrle v. State
In Buhrle v. State1 1 4 the Wyoming Supreme Court ruled that
the trial judge properly excluded expert testimony on the battered
woman syndrome. Defendant's husband in Buhrle had abused her
repeatedly during their eighteen-year marriage. On September 24,
109. Id. at 519 n.1, 423 N.E.2d at 138-39 n.1. These reasons were as follows:
1. There was no proper proffer of expert testimony.
2. Appellant's expert had no personal contact with appellant.
3. No hypothetical question was propounded to appellant's expert witness.
4. There was no determination that appellant was in fact a battered woman.
5. Analysis of the issues raised was within the realm of the jury.
6. The trial court's jury charge more than adequately covered the situation.
7. There was no prejudice to appellant.
8. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Id.
110. Id. at 520, 423 N.E.2d at 139; see supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
111. 66 Ohio St. 2d at 521, 423 N.E.2d at 140.
112. Id. The Thomas court neither explained the basis of its finding that the method-
ology employed by battered woman syndrome experts had not gained acceptance nor dis-
cussed any of the considerations usually mentioned in connection with this question. See
supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text; see also infra text accompanying note 171.
113. Id. at 521, 423 N.E.2d at 140.
114. 627 P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1981).
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1979, defendant's husband asked his attorney to prepare divorce
papers, and he executed an affidavit to obtain a restraining order
against defendant. On the following day defendant and her hus-
band had an argument, and defendant threatened her husband
with a shovel. He reacted by beating her about the head, neck, and
shoulders with a pair of work boots.'15 On September 26, 1979, de-
fendant's husband moved to a motel. Slightly more than a week
after the argument during which the beating occurred, defendant's
husband came to the family home and, according to defendant's
testimony, asked defendant to come to his motel room so that they
could talk. That evening defendant drove to the motel and the
couple argued through the motel room door (with the night chain
fastened) for an hour and forty-five minutes. Defendant then shot
her husband with a hunting rifle that she had brought to the
motel. When occupants of an adjoining room arrived at the scene,
defendant was kneeling over her husband and shouting that some-
one had shot him. Defendant testified that she did not attempt to
run away from the motel. The evidence revealed, however, that she
tried to hide the rubber gloves that she had been wearing immedi-
ately after the shooting, and that she placed the hunting rifle un-
derneath a nearby house trailer. At the time of her arrest she had
her husband's wallet in her possession.
Defendant was tried and convicted of the second degree mur-
der of her husband. At trial the court permitted defendant to de-
scribe the violent history of her marriage to prove that she acted in
self-defense. In addition, defendant testified that she thought her
husband was reaching for a gun that he usually kept with him
when she shot him. A search of the motel room after the incident
established that defendant's husband did not have a gun with him
on the night of the killing.11
The Buhrle trial judge did not permit defendant to introduce
the expert testimony of Dr. Lenore Walker on the battered woman
syndrome. 17 Dr. Walker planned to tell the jury the following:
115. Id. at 1375.
116. Id. at 1376.
117. Id. at 1377. The reasons given by the trial judge for excluding the evidence fo-
cused on the defense's failure to explain adequately the battered woman syndrome and its
application to defendant's particular situation. The trial judge held that the evidence was
inadmissible for three reasons: (1) voir dire did not establish that the state of the art per-
mitted a reasonable expert opinion; (2) the expert did not sufficiently explain the basis for
her opinions and, therefore, the opinions would not aid the jury; and (3) the testimony
about defendant's state of mind at the time of the shooting was inadequate and, therefore,
would not aid the jury. Id.
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(1) Mrs. Buhrle was a battered woman and a battered woman's behavior dif-
fers from that of other women.
(2) Mrs. Buhrle was in a state of learned helplessness resulting in loss of free
will.
(3) Because of learned helplessness, Mrs. Buhrle's ability to walk away from a
situation or escape was impaired.
(4) Mrs. Buhrle perceived herself to be acting in self-defense.11
The Wyoming Supreme Court indicated that Dr. Walker also in-
tended to express opinions on whether defendant's fear for her life
at the time of the shooting was reasonable and whether defendant
was capable of retreating at the time she shot her husband.' 1 '
The Wyoming Supreme Court's opinion affirming the trial
judge's decision to exclude the evidence focused on three principal
problems with the proffered expert testimony. First, Dr. Walker's
description of her conclusions on the battered woman syndrome
contained in her book and brought out on voir dire appeared
overly tentative. 120 Second, Dr. W Iker apparently could not ex-
plain why certain of defendant's actions did not conform to the
battered woman syndrome. 12 ' Last, the opinions that Dr. Walker
planned to express about defendant's state of mind at the time of
the shooting went "far beyond" the proffered testimony in Ibn-
Tamas. 122
The Buhrle opinion revealed that in the preface to her book,
The Battered Woman,2 s Dr. Walker wrote that she felt "uneasy"
about stating some of her conclusions because they "seemed too
tentative to write down in the positive manner" in which she
presented them, but that they were "confirmed repeatedly by all
the available data so far.' 24 On voir dire Dr. Walker further cast
doubt on the validity of her study of battered women when, at-
tempting to explain these statements from her book, she stated,
"That's why I received the research grant, to study the matter in a
much more scientific way.' 25 The Buhrle court took the view that
"[t]he quotation[s] from Dr. Walker's book. . . and elsewhere in
her voir dire suggests that Dr. Walker may make certain conclu-
sions and state certain theories, then engage in research to attempt
118. Id. For a more detailed description of the battered woman syndrome, see supra
note 13.
119. 627 P.2d at 1378.
120. Id. at 1376; see infra text accompanying notes 123-26.
121. 627 P.2d at 1377; see infra text accompanying notes 129-31.
122. 627 P.2d at 1378; see infra text accompanying notes 132-35.
123. L. WALKER, supra note 1.




to substantiate those theories and conclusions. 1 26 The court noted
that research on the battered woman syndrome is in its infancy, its
objectives are difficult to identify, statistical analysis of the syn-
drome is in the preparation stage, and acceptance of the "phenom-
enon" is limited to those engaged in the research and to the orga-
nizations that make research grants.2 7 On this basis the court,
without denying the existence of a battered woman syndrome, con-
cluded that the defense in Buhrle did not lay an adequate founda-
tion to demonstrate that the state of the art would permit a rea-
sonable opinion and that this opinion would not aid the jury.1 28
The Buhrle court expressed concern over Dr. Walker's inabil-
ity to explain the reasons that defendant's behavior deviated from
"standard battered woman behavior."1 2 The court stated that in
explaining her opinions Dr. Walker failed to consider certain ques-
tions, including why the killing took place more than a week after
the most recent altercation, why defendant took a hunting rifle to
the motel, and why defendant hid the gun and the rubber gloves
after the shooting. According to the court, this behavior does not
fit within the battered woman syndrome or the standard battered
woman self-defense situation.1 0 In addition, the court concluded
that since the trial judge had difficulty understanding Dr. Walker's
explanations, the jury would have had the same problem.1 31
The final aspect of the proffered testimony that the Buhrle
court addressed concerned the scope of the opinions that Dr.
Walker intended to offer. The court found that the proposed opin-
ions in Buhrle were far more sweeping than the opinions the Ibn-
Tamas court admitted.1 3 2 The defense in Ibn-Tamas, the Buhrle
court explained, offered Dr. Walker's testimony for two purposes:
"[t]o describe the phenomenon of 'wife battering"' and to elicit an
expert opinion about the extent to which the defendant's behavior
and personality corresponded to the behavior and personality of
the 110 battered women the expert had studied.' 33 In contrast to
the testimony offered in Buhrle, the court noted that in Ibn-
Tamas Dr. Walker merely supplied background information to aid
126. Id. at 1377; see infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
127. 627 P.2d at 1377.
128. Id. at 1378.
129. Id. at 1377.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1378; see supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
133. 627 P.2d at 1378.
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in the jury's understanding of defendant's state of mind at the
time of the shooting. In Buhrle, however, Dr. Walker planned to
testify about the "ultimate questions" whether defendant actually
and reasonably believed that she was in imminent danger when she
shot her husband, whether defendant was capable of retreating at
that time, and whether, in the expert's opinion, defendant believed
she was acting in self-defense.13 4 The Buhrle court reasoned that
the Ibn-Tamas decision did not justify the proposed testimony." 5
Although the court in Buhrle emphasized that the proposed
opinions went too far, this language did not appear as part of the
holding. In its concluding paragraph on battered woman syndrome
expert testimony the court said, "In our holding here we are not
saying that this type of expert testimony is not admissible; we are
merely holding that the state of the art was not adequately demon-
strated to the court, and because of inadequate foundation the
proposed opinions would not aid the jury."', Thus, whether the
Buhrle court would have permitted the opinions if the defense had
presented an adequate foundation is not clear.
C. Smith v. State
In Smith v. State1 37 the Georgia Supreme Court reversed a
battered woman's conviction for the voluntary manslaughter of her
live-in boyfriend because the trial court had improperly excluded
expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome from the jury's
consideration. " 8 Defendant had been dating and intermittently
living with her boyfriend for approximately four years. The testi-
mony revealed that he had beaten her throughout the relation-
ship.139 On the evening of the shooting, defendant's boyfriend be-
came angry with her when she asked him to stop touching her in
bed because she was tired. After he told her not to tell him when
to touch her, defendant dressed and started downstairs. When the
boyfriend held up his fist and told her she was not going anywhere,
defendant sat on the bed. He then kicked her in the back, hit her
on the head, choked her, and threw her against the door. Defen-




137. 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981).
138. Id. at 619-20, 277 S.E.2d at 683.
139. Id. at 613-14, 277 S.E.2d at 679. Defendant stated that her boyfriend's beatings
worsened when she dated other men. Id.
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downstairs to call her mother. Before she was able to use the tele-
phone, however, her boyfriend removed the upstairs telephone
from the receiver; he then ran downstairs and took the telephone
away from her. As defendant was attempting to run from the
apartment, her boyfriend slammed the door on her foot. She then
closed her eyes and fired the gun three times. After the shooting
defendant went to a neighbor's house and called the police.140
Defendant asserted self-defense at trial. She told the jury that
she was afraid to stop seeing her boyfriend because he threatened
her.141 She also testified that after he beat her he would apologize
and say he loved her, and, because she believed him, she did not
call her friends or the police.142 According to her testimony, on the
day of the shooting her boyfriend had frightened her by saying she
should call her mother because "he was going to do something to
her.''14' After receiving this threat defendant feared that her boy-
friend would hurt her more than before. 4' Defendant concluded
her testimony by stating that she shot her boyfriend "in fear for
her life. ' 145
The defense offered a clinical psychologist's testimony on the
battered woman syndrome and on whether defendant's situation
conformed with that of other battered women.1 " She planned to
explain why battered women generally do not report the abuse and
to testify that battered women often choose to remain with their
batterers, that battered women typically believe their batterers'
promises not to beat them again, that over time battered women
become increasingly afraid of their batterers, and, finally, that a
battered woman's primary emotion is fear. 47 The witness would
have testified that her interviews with defendant and her family
were the basis for her conclusion that "defendant fell within the
battered woman profile and had the typical battered woman's
140. Id. at 612-13, 277 S.E.2d at 679. None of the police officers who came to defen-
dant's apartment after the shooting observed that defendant had received any injuries. Id.
141. Id.; see supra note 139.
142. 247 Ga. at 613, 277 S.E.2d at 679. Battered woman syndrome experts have discov-
ered that this seemingly unreasonable belief is common among battered women. See supra
note 13.
143. 247 Ga. at 613, 277 S.E.2d at 679.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 614, 277 S.E.2d at 680. The testimony proposed in Smith is similar to that
which was approved in Ibn-Tamas. Apparently the expert in Smith did not plan to render
opinions about defendant's state of mind at the time of the shooting. See infra text accom-
panying notes 178-88.




The prosecution did not challenge either the expert's qualifi-
cations or the state of the art of the battered woman syndrome.
The trial court, however, found the testimony to be inadmissible
because it would improperly invade the province of the jury.14' In
affirming the trial court's decision, the Georgia Court of Appeals
held that the trial court properly excluded the expert's testimony
because it was opinion evidence on an ultimate fact that was for
the jury to decide. °50 The Georgia Supreme Court reversed, holding
that expert opinion testimony on an ultimate fact is admissible if
the expert will draw conclusions that a jury ordinarily would be
unable to draw.151 The court ruled, therefore, that the trial court
should have admitted the expert testimony because the testimony
explaining why battered women do not leave their mates, why they
do not report the abuse, and why they fear increased aggression
"would be such conclusions that jurors could not ordinarily draw
for themselves."' 52
IV. ANALYSIS
The courts in Thomas, Buhrle, and Smith all employed a sim-
ilar analytical framework to determine the admissibility of the
proffered expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome. Nev-
ertheless, the application of this theoretically uniform standard
produced significantly divergent results. This Recent Development
acknowledges the legitimate judicial concerns that surround this
testimony. Some courts probably fear that permitting experts to
explain why battered women behave as they do represents a subtle
endorsement of homicide as a justifiable retaliation against bat-
tering. 53 This Recent Development maintains, however, that ex-
148. Id.
149. Id. at 613, 277 S.E.2d at 680.
150. Id. at 614-15, 277 S.E.2d at 680. The court of appeals did not explain which as-
pects of the proposed expert opinion in Smith concerned an ultimate fact. The expert in
Smith was planning to state only that defendant was a typical battered woman. Although
the expert had stated previously that the primary emotion of battered women is fear, the
expert apparently did not intend to render an opinion whether defendant was afraid when
she shot her husband. The expert would have left this inference for the jury.
151. Id. at 619, 277 S.E.2d at 683.
152. Id. The Smith opinion focuses almost entirely on the ultimate issue question and
reviews Georgia case law on that topic. The only aspect of the opinion that deals specifically
with battered woman syndrome evidence quotes extensively from Ibn-Tamas. Id. at 618-19,
277 S.E.2d at 682-83. Because the prosecution had challenged only the subject matter ele-
ment, the Smith court did not consider the other requirements for expert testimony.
153. See Note, Does Wife Abuse Justify Homicide?, 24 WAYNE L. Rzv. 1705 (1978).
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pert testimony on the battered syndrome does satisfy the general
requirements for the admissibility of expert testimony."" Rather
than excluding the testimony under the guise of failure to satisfy
expert testimony standards, courts instead should restrict the
scope of the testimony to that which is necessary to dispel mis-
taken beliefs about battered women.155
The first requirement of proper expert testimony is that the
subject of the inference be beyond the ken of the average layman.
The Ibn-Tamas and Smith courts correctly found this element
present in battered woman syndrome expert testimony.85 The
prosecutor's suggestion in Ibn-Tamas that the "logical reaction" of
a frightened battered woman would be to call the police or to leave
her battererI57 probably represents the viewpoint of the average
person. Reasoning in this way, a jury would infer that a battered
woman who stayed with her batterer did not fear him. Therefore,
as the courts in Ibn-Tamas and Smith recognized, testimony by
battered woman syndrome experts that battered women are afraid
of their batterers, but do not leave them because they believe that
"they will be found and hurt even more," leads to an inference
that is beyond the ken of the average layman.158 Without this ex-
pert testimony, jurors ordinarily would not be able to draw this
inference for themselves. The Thomas court's cursory statement
that juries are capable of understanding and deciding for them-
selves whether a defendant has proved self-defense and that this
expert testimony is not beyond the ken of the average layman,
1 9
without any further discussion of the subject matter requirement,
fails to recognize the purpose of battered woman syndrome expert
testimony. Indeed, the statements illustrate the Thomas court's re-
fusal to consider seriously and to examine the implications of the
expert's findings on battered woman syndrome. Courts applying ei-
ther the Federal Rules of Evidence standard, which requires only
Some commentators fear that acquittals in murder trials involving battered women defen-
dants will result in "open season on men." See Schneider & Jordon, supra note 2, at 150 n.4.
154. See infra text accompanying notes 156-74. Of course, this statement assumes that
the proponent of the expert testimony will present an adequate foundation. See supra notes
35-60 and accompanying text. Defense attorneys should not attempt to use the battered
woman syndrome phenomenon without the aid of a qualified expert. This problem appeared
in People v. White, discussed supra text accompanying notes 92-96.
155. See infra text accompanying notes 178-88.
156. See supra notes 71-77, 152 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 64 and accompanying text; see also L. WALKER, supra note 1, at
20, 26, 29.
158. See supra notes 75-77, 152 and accompanying text.
159. See supra text accompanying note 110.
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that the testimony assist the trier of fact,160 or the more stringent
common-law standard, which requires that the subject be beyond
the ken of the average layman,"" should find on the basis of the
courts' reasoning in Ibn-Tamas and Smith that the subject matter
element is present.
The Thomas and Smith courts were apparently satisfied that
the expert witness possessed sufficient skill, knowledge, or experi-
ence in the particular field "as to make it appear that his opinion
or inference will probably aid the trier in his search for truth.''162
The Buhrle court, however, excluded the evidence in part because
of a concern that the expert did not satisfy this qualification re-
quirement. Although the Buhrle court stated that Dr. Walker, the
expert in that case, possessed "impressive academic and profes-
sional credentials,"1 63 it went on to hold in part that Dr. Walker's
proposed opinions would not aid the jury."" This holding appar-
ently resulted from the court's examination of Dr. Walker's voir
dire in which she noted that her conclusions were "too tentative"
to be stated in a positive manner and that she was preparing to
study the matter "in a much more scientific way."'" These facts
led the court to criticize Dr. Walker and to suggest that she made
conclusions and then engaged in research to substantiate her con-
clusions. 6' Thus, although the Buhrle court did not state expressly
that Dr. Walker did not satisfy the qualification requirement, the
court, in holding that Dr. Walker's opinions would not aid the jury,
implicitly rejected her status as an expert. The qualification re-
quirement, however, should not have been at issue in Buhrle. The
purpose of this requirement is to ensure that courts allow only wit-
nesses who have special knowledge in a field to testify as experts
because permitting witnesses without special knowledge to testify
would not aid the jury.16 7 The Buhrle court should have found that
160. FED. R. EviD. 702; see supra text accompanying note 38.
161. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
162. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 25, § 13. The Thomas court did not mention this
second requirement for expert testimony, and the Smith court assumed it to have been met
because the state did not challenge the expert's qualifications.
163. Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Wyo. 1981). Indeed, the Buhrle court de-
scribed Dr. Walker as the "pioneer" in the study of battered women. Id.
164. Id. at 1378; see supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text.
165. 627 P.2d at 1376; see supra text accompanying notes 124-25. In addition, before
stating that the opinions would not aid the jury the court emphasized Dr. Walker's inability
to explain why the Buhrle defendant's behavior was not entirely consistent with typical
battered woman behavior. Id. at 1377.
'166. Id.
167. Additionally, some courts fear that expert witnesses will influence juries unduly
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Dr. Walker's concededly impressive credentials established that
she had sufficient special knowledge in the study of battered wo-
men to ensure that her testimony would assist the jury in under-
standing battered women."' 8 Finally, the court should have left any
doubts about Dr. Walker's qualifications as an expert to the prose-
cution to present to the jury on cross-examination. Then the jury
could determine what weight should be given to the expert testi-
mony in light of any deficiencies raised by the prosecution.
The Thomas and Buhrle courts' holding that the state of bat-
tered woman syndrome research did not permit a reasonable ex-
pert opinion resulted from improper applications of this final ex-
pert testimony requirement.16' In Ibn-Tamas the court explained
that this state-of-the-art standard does not require that an expert's
findings have gained general acceptance in the relevant field;17 0 in-
stead, the methodology employed by the expert in reaching the
findings must have gained general acceptance. 71 The Thomas
court correctly articulated this standard, but summarily concluded
that the proffered testimony failed to meet the standard.1 7 2 This
court neither discussed the methodology used in developing the
battered woman syndrome nor cited any evidence suggesting that
the methodology is not accepted. The Buhrle court conducted a
more thoughtful inquiry into the methodology used by Dr.
Walker.M After questioning Dr. Walker's methodology, however,
the Buhrle court, curiously, stated that the "phenomenon" (pre-
sumably the battered woman syndrome), as opposed to the meth-
odology, has gained only limited acceptance. 7 Although the prose-
cution in either Thomas or Buhrle could have presented evidence
to show that other psychologists do not recognize the methodology
employed as a proper one, doubts about the validity of the bat-
tered woman syndrome theory should be resolved as the Ibn-
because of a special "aura" of expertise. See supra text accompanying note 43.
168. The Buhrle court's concerns regarding Dr. Walker's testimony more appropri-
ately address the requirement that the expert's methodology be generally accepted in the
field. When the court discussed this requirement, however, it focused not on the methodol-
ogy, but on the phenomenon of the battered woman syndrome. See infra text accompanying
notes 173-74.
169. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
170. Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 637-38 (D.C. 1979); see supra text
accompanying note 80.
171. Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 637-38 (D.C. 1979); see supra text
accompanying note 80.
172. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 124-28.
174. Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Wyo. 1981).
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Tamas court suggested-by allowing the prosecution to present
other experts to challenge the findings before the jury.17 5 The jury
should have the opportunity to hear this conflicting testimony con-
cerning the validity of the battered woman syndrome theory and to
determine what weight, if any, the battered woman syndrome tes-
timony deserves.
V. PROPOSALS AND CONCLUSION
As the above analysis indicates, the Thomas and Buhrle
courts should have found that the proffered expert testimony satis-
fied the three requirements for admissibility of expert testimony.
The compelling analysis in Ibn-Tamas shows that battered woman
syndrome expert testimony can meet the traditional expert testi-
mony requirements and demonstrates that this evidence presents
no special problems. The courts in Thomas and Buhrle, however,
expressed serious concern about the novel use of this testimony in
a murder trial. The Thomas court questioned the testimony's rele-
vance to self-defense. 17 6 The Buhrle court focused much of its
analysis on the far-sweeping nature of the opinions that the expert
proposed to render.17 7 These courts' discomfort with the proffered
testimony is understandable because the notion that a defendant
apparently motivated by retaliation might instead have been moti-
vated by fear is difficult to accept. These concerns, however, are
indicative of the misconceptions that surround battered women,
and forcefully illustrate the need for this type of testimony.
This Recent Development proposes that courts should permit
the use of battered woman syndrome expert testimony, but restrict
its use to informing juries of the peculiar mental and emotional
state of battered women.27 8 This role of the expert as educator
would serve to dispel a jury's misconceptions about battered wo-
men and, at the same time, draw the focus of the testimony away
from the implication which troubled the Buhrle court-that the
battered woman syndrome represents a new defense to murder.
The Advisory Committee explains in a note that rule 702 of the
175. Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 638 n.24; see also United States v.
Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1975) ("it is better to admit relevant scientific evidence in
the same manner as other expert testimony and allow its weight to be attacked by cross-
examination and refutation").
176. See supra text accompanying note 109.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 132-35.
178. For example, an expert could describe the syndrome in lay terms as in Ibn-
Tamas and Smith. See supra note 13.
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Federal Rules of Evidence suggests the use of expert testimony as
a vehicle to educate juries. '7 This note states,
Most of the literature assumes that experts testify only in the form of opin-
ions. The assumption is logically unfounded. The rule accordingly recognizes
that an expert on the stand may give a dissertation or exposition of scientific
or other principles relevant to the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them
to the facts.... [I]t seems wise to recognize that opinions are not indispen-
sable and to encourage the use of expert testimony in non-opinion form when
counsel believes the trier can itself draw the requisite inference. 5 0
Expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome would
adapt well to this educational approach. A battered woman defen-
dant may testify about previous physical aggression by the vic-
tim.181 Courts admit this evidence of prior batterings when the de-
fendant claims self-defense because this evidence helps the jury
evaluate the defendant's state of mind1 8 -- a critical element of the
self-defense assertion.18 3 When the jury hears the testimony, it
probably will begin to question both the defendant's reasons for
staying with her batterer and her assertions that she feared him.'"
To further aid the jury in evaluating the defendant's state of mind,
courts should admit expert testimony explaining the effects that
physical abuse has on a battered woman's mental state. With the
evidence of defendant's prior beatings and the expert testimony
about the psychological effects of beating on battered women, a
jury could then better evaluate defendant's state of mind.
Although the modern trend encompassed in the Federal Rules
of Evidence is to permit virtually all opinions,18 5 expert opinions
on battered woman syndrome are not necessarily valuable testimo-
nial tools. In fact, as in Buhrle, battered woman syndrome experts'
inability to explain their opinions adequately may even discredit
their findings.18 The Smith court quoted with approval the Ibn-
Tamas court's reasoning that expert testimony on battered woman
syndrome can serve as background information for juries.1s7 In-
deed, the restriction of this expert testimony to the information
179. FEn. R. Evw. 702 advisory committee note.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., State v. Dozier, 255 S.E.2d 552, 555 (W. Va. 1979).
182. See Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 633 (D.C. 1979); State v. Dozier,
255 S.E.2d 552, 555 (W. Va. 1979).
183. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 157-58.
185. See FED. R. Evm. 701, 702, 704.
186. The Buhrle court indicated that Dr. Walker's conclusions about defendant were
without any apparent empirical basis. Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Wyo. 1981).
187. Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 618-19, 277 S.E.2d 678, 682-83 (1981).
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needed to dispel misconceptions about battered women would viti-
ate the perception, such as that expressed in Buhrle, that these
experts encourage juries to excuse killing."' 8
The findings of battered woman syndrome experts provide im-
portant and valuable insights into the mental state of a surpris-
ingly large group of criminal defendants."' 9 Although courts cannot
accept these findings as a basis for excusing killing, they should
accept the information that these experts can provide to jurors.
Courts should recognize the expert's testimony as proper, but limit
it to the role for which it is presently best suited-to educate ju-
rors on the findings of battered women studies so that jurors will
understand the mental state of a widely misunderstood segment of
the population.
MEREDITH BRINEGAR CROSS
188. The proposed expert opinion in Buhrle would have consisted of a statement that
defendant reasonably feared for her life when she went to the motel and shot her husband,
and that defendant had an impaired ability to escape her husband's abuse. See supra text
accompanying notes 118-19.
189. See Schneider & Jordon, supra note 2, at 149 n.3. These authors include an ex-
tensive list of trials in which the prosecution charged battered women with assault or mur-
der of their mates.
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